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Environmental audits, audit privilege laws and
environmental management systems are all threads in
a larger fabric of "reinvention," or in the drive toward
"self-regulation_"2 The quality of that developing fabric
is a matter of considerable disagreement, however,
It is popular in contemporary discourse, to assert
that a consensus exists for the notion that our present
environmental regulatory system (disparagingly
dubbed "command and control") has lived out its usefulness. I happen not to be part of that consensus, if
such exists. But neither am I one to suggest that our
present system is perfect or efficient or nearly as effective as it could be
One must inquire into one's own 'first principles,"
I think, to appropriately assess the value of any proposed alteration to the existing regulatory scheme, My
own biases include the notions that public information, public involvement in the regulatory process and
litigation (both for private damages and injunctions
and to ensure the performance of nondiscretionary
agency actions) are all essential parts of an effective
and democratic regulatory process Another of my first
principles is that "health-based" standards are not a
sufficient basis for environmental regulation 3

By Jerry Speir0
.
Director, Tulane institute for En'.vironmental Law and
Policy. Tulane University Law School New Orleans, Louisiana I.D,
1991, Loyola (New Orleansi University, LL M, 1994 Yale University
Mr Speir was a panelist at Hastings West-North'w.est s 1998 symposium entitled Envronmental Audits Pnriviled Inlormation or Pnvileged
Violations?
I 'Regulatory reform or-reinventon propsals proliferate,
in the present era, with remarkable speed For a hsting of all reinvention projects at EPA which of course does n.t co.rer all statebased initiatives see Dzr aorz of Reinventon Proecs (visited Nov 20,
19981 <wwwepa govlreinvent/noteb kibyall htm> The MultiState Working Group on Environmental Management Systems is
coordinating an array of pilot projects at the state level For background, see Mult-Slate Working Group on Enmronnintal Management
9
Systems (visited Mar 7, IQ
9J <,w-,wp2paas,org/is.o ms'g/fatsheet.htm>
2 The title of the panel on w hich Mr Spear partizipated ,'as
Advantages of Selt.Regutation
3 For a contrary 1perhaps maliorityi view see RenaI
Steinzor. Reinemting Environmental Rgau!aon The Danjerous Journey
from Command to Self-Contro! 22 H-.1 E'-r.. L Rr. 1031 198) ,,hich
ends with the suggestion that the -overridng' need is for 'gathering the information Ithe EPAJ needs to dev.e op the optmal form ol
pollution control-health-base:l standards I at 202 1 do not
mean to disparage health-based standards entirely Certainly, there
is value in knowing which substances present the greatest risks anri
of prioritizing those threats But we must alsoz recognize the hm~tations on such knowledge For a usetul surnmari of another
approach, that of -optimal pollution: see Carol M Rose,
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My expectation is that we cannot develop
those health-based standards, at least not sufficiently to have a regulatory system truly
based on them. It is simply too complex, too
costly. There are too many things we do not
begin to understand about the impacts of all
the things we put into the environment, too
many potential synergistic effects, too many
things (like endocrine disruptors) waiting to be
discovered. Further, chasing environmental
problems on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis,
with massive justification required for the regulation of each one, is not likely to be costeffective.
So what, then, does an ideal environmental policy look like? What can it look like except
a system based on caution, and a system
based on progressive reductions in our emissions toward zero? In fact, that is not the radical
idea it once was. The State of Pennsylvania, for
example, is presently promoting "zero emissions" as a part of its Strategic Environmental
4
Management Initiative.
Arguably, ISO 14001 could provide such a
system. ISO 14001 is an international standard
for environmental management systems. It
rests on the notion that improvements in the
manner by which one manages environmental
impacts will necessarily improve the matter of
those impacts. It starts with an assessment of
everything that an organization does that
impacts the environment, and it commits the
organization to continual improvement of the
system by which it manages those impacts. In
Environmental Lessons, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1023. 1032-34

(1994). My "toward zero" argument is not meant to suggest that we bring "all cars to a screeching halt,- id. at
1032, or stop all waste water dischargers without delay.
Rather, my ideal system would encourage and target "continual improvement," which is, of course, language from
the ISO 14001 standard. Defining "optimal pollution," I
fear, may be a hopeless (and hopelessly expensive) project,
4. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <www.dep.state.pa.us/
dep/deputate/pollprevTech.Assistance/zeroemis.htm>.

Also, an international "Zero Emissions Research Initiative
(ZERI)" has recently concluded its 4th Annual World ZERI
Congress. See Zero Emissions Research Initiative (visited Nov.
20, 1998) <www.zeri.org/>.
5. For a basic elaboration of the idea, see LARRY E.
RUFF, THE ECONOMIC COMMON SENSE OF POLLUTION, reprinted in
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an ideal world, administered in good faith,
implementation of the ISO 14031 standard
should drive emissions, if not to zero, at least
toward that equilibrium point where economists speak of marginal costs equling margin5
al benefits.
Of course, that economic factor is the real
driver of reinvention in all its guises. There is
very little debate currently, for example, that it
is appropriate for government to "balance the
relationship between ensuring environmental
quality and reducing compliance costs." 6 Nor

are there many eyebrows raised even by the
notion that what is at stake are such fundamental notions as "who should participate and
7
what ground rules should apply."
What is afoot, arguably, in thE many faces
of "reinvention" is an overhaul cf our entire
notion of government. A commcn thread in
most reinvention initiatives is some kind of
"devolution" of regulatory decisionmaking to
some kind of "stakeholder" process that gives
industry and public interest representatives an
"opportunity to participate," something more
suggestive of direct democracy than our traditional representative system.
On its surface, the impulse is a positive
one: give more information, and therefore
more "power," to local citizens; make industrial
facilities more responsive to the "reeds" of the
local community. Such arrangements are
arguably the essence of citizenship and
responsibility in a civil society. One with a
more skeptical turn of mind, however, might be
(Robert
Dorfman and Nancy S. Dorfman, eds, 3d 2d., 1993). It Is
much simpler, of course, to be relatively precise about the
marginal cost of a new regulation than it is about the marginal benefit to be derived from It The former can frequently be calculated in terms of new equipment or
process changes. The latter assumes knowledge about
causes and effects that we generally lack and requires further assumptions about the value of life and health and
ecosystems that do not lend themselves to easy reduction That is not to say that there is anything wrong with a
concern for marginal costs and benefits, nor with basing
policy on a desire to balance costs and benefits, to the
extent that we can judge those things in some acceptable
way.
6. Steinzor, supra note 3, at 105
7. Id.at 105-06.
ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT SELECTED READINGS,

Sping 1999

forgiven for perceiving other motivations
behind such devolution. What expertise, after

all, do the citizens across the fence line have
for dealing with the engineers, attorneys and
public relations professionals of their corporate neighbors? Even if they possess some
expertise, why should it be their unpaid task to
participate in devolved, reinvented regulatory
processes? Is not that what they pay taxes for
state and federal bureaucrats to do? And is not
devolution to the local level a clever contrivance for subverting what limited expertise
and power environmental advocacy organizations have managed to concentrate in offices
generally focused at the national level? 8
Potentially, then, reinvention is both
threat and promise, and environmental advocates may be forgiven for seeing themselves as
"beneficiaries" of more of the former than the
latter.
An illustration: I was surprised recently to
come across the following quote from William
Ruckelshaus from a 1995 piece in Environmental
Forum: "The critical thing about such a process,
and the only way to make it work, is that all
participants have to understand that the
process is the entire and exclusive theater for
decisions.... There will be no appeal, and no

way to weasel out of the deal."9
Deals without appeal, negotiated locally,
are the sorts of outcomes apt to drive the public interest crowd to full battle stations. A deal
is a deal? How about this deal: A major company is operating a landfill. Neighbors complain about odors and gases that they associate with health effects in the community,
Lawyers for the neighbors, through discovery,
get hold of environmental audits. The audits,
according to the plaintiffs,
8. For the clearest articulation of this argument,
see Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaboration Has
Its Limits. HIGH COUNTRY NEws. May 13, 1996, at 7
McCloskey is Chairperson of the Sierra Club
9. William D. Ruckelshaus. Stopping the Pendulum,
ENvrL. FORUM, (NoviDec. 1995), at 29, quoted it Steinzor,
supra note 23, at 121 n.64.

10. Information quoted here comes from a statement entitled "WMX (Waste Management. Inc )Demands

Environmental Secrecy in Pollution of Cincinnati
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proved essential facts that ultimately
compelled the state to order the emissions stopped Seemingly random
pieces of data were put into context by
the audits lTheyl establishled] a pattern of events over time
Ithati
showed a history of alleged violations,
land,] proved that the company was
aware of its obligations to implement
measures to stop the gas migration
and yet failed to act 1In the midst of this, the state of Ohio passed
an audit privilege statute. The landfill operator, WMX, sought to "recapture' the documents and have the information in them ruled
inadmissible WMX is one of the leading
national advocates of audit privilege legislationThere are three lessons to be learned from
that story, I think One yes, violations that are
perceived to harm people will get you sued,
and they should Two the companies that
stand to benefit the most from audit privilege
statutes "are the companies,, that the government, laverage citizensl. and law-abiding
members of the regulated community have a
common interest in bringing into compliance."" Three the greatest "cost" of the privilege is that it can prevent us from learning of
serious violations and taking corrective action
What is the connection between devolution and audit privilege? I do not really suggest that there is a Grand Conspirator masterfully disassembling environmental regulation;
I have given up believing anyone is smart
enough to run the conspiracy Audit privilege,
however, is one 'logical" outcome of notions
that voluntary disclosure and prompt remedy
of regulatory violations are an important piece
Neighborhoc-i
Demanstrates Dangers of Nle-,&
Environmental Audit Se:rezi La.s b, Da,.i Altman,
attorney tor Ir.:,al residents and others I 1arn:i3r 28, 1997)

ton file '%ith the authorl For mrre informat on on the
same issue, see Te:inronu ot te Sierra Crt&n MAujit Pnrieae
Bekre the Su'Qmntittee on Ot'rimaot and fn zrlaabon! of the
Howre Commerce Comnuitee i6th Cong I lQ9gj istatement
of David Altman attorneyi ion tfle, ith the authort
Ii Benenet L Heart Tne Enmronmentat Audit Pni!ege
A Step tit the Wrong Directon T k'
L .% RE305-308
(Aug lb. 199~51
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of the regulatory scheme. Firms will not disclose and remedy, the argument goes, if those
disclosures are not privileged. But it is also
clear that another part of that outcome could
be a dramatic change in the alignment of
power in the legal arena.
In short, there can be little question that
audit privilege legislation is "tort reform" by
another name. Its principal argument is that
the benefit to be gained from auditing, reporting violations, and promptly remedying them
is greater than the benefit to be gained from
private actions seeking damages for environmental harms.
There is a certain irony in the fact that, on
the one hand, devolution to the local level (of
what are essentially regulatory functions) is
said to produce greater societal benefits than a
centralized regulatory bureaucracy. On the
other hand, the audit privilege versus tort liability argument is decided against the interests
of local involvement and local right-to-know.
Such an outcome argues that it is a good thing
to make decisions at the local level, so long as
those decisions do not require the release of
any information.
Self-auditing is a good thing. And, yes, our
policy should encourage it. In fact, I think our
policy does encourage it quite reasonably. The
EPA's self-auditing (or "self-policing") policy
says that if you discover, report and correct a
violation, you will not be fined for it, so long as
it is is not a repeat violation, there was no

criminal activity involved, there was no economic gain, and there was no (actual) harm to
people or the environment. 12 It does not render
the information secret. (Though EPA, in fact,
has not sought the audit reports,',3 and only
one case in one state has "involved the use of
information contained in a voluntarily initiated
environmental audit in a civil penalty
4
action."1 )
If that does not encourage auditing, so be
it. There is certainly no evidence that audit
privilege statutes encourage auditing. Seventyfive percent or more of all firms already do it,
and only one-fifth of the 25 percert who do not
(5 percent of the total) claimed their "concern
that audit information could be used against
the company" was even one of the top five choices (of twelve) among reasons for rot auditing.'"
Audit privilege is a solution looking for a
problem. ISO 14001, on the other hand, is perhaps a solution that we are trying to turn into
a problem. By trying to enlist it as a public policy tool, we may well destroy it, or we may turn
it into the next great leap forward in environmental regulation. The jury is still out on that
one.
One thing that could kill it is for it to get
ensnared in the audit privilege controversy.
And I believe it could.
ISO 14001 begins, essentially, with an
audit, called a "review." 16 Would that review be
privileged under state audit privilege laws? In
some states, arguably not, because they define

Discovery,

Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60

ducting audits. There was no difference in the responses
based on whether the state in which the racility operates

Fed, Reg. 66,706-12 (1995).

has an audit law. an audit policy, or no law or policy NCSL

13. EPA has never criminally prosecuted a company
that has self-disclosed a voluntary audit-nor has a state
to his knowledge. Telephone Interview with Brian Reidel,
EPA's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
(Mar. 17, 1998).

also determined that the existence of envi'onmental dudit
privilege and immunity laws or audit policies does not
appear to influence the disclosure of violations" The
study was based on interviews with 988 manufacturing
facilities in 28 states Larry Morandi. State Environmental
Audit Laws and Policies- An Evaluation, Natiznal Council of
State Legislatures, Oct 1998, at vii.

12,

14.

See Incentives

for Self-Policing:

Dave Ronald, The Case Against an Environmental

Audit Privilege, 29 CHEM.

WASTE LITIG. RPTR.

167 (Jan. 1995).

15. Heart, supra note I1.at 306 (citing Price
Waterhouse Environmental Audit Survey of U.S.
Businesses (Mar. 1995)). In fact, since this paper was presented, the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL)

has issued a report finding "that the existence of environmental audit privilege and immunity laws or audit policies
does not appear to influence the level of audit activity.
Eighty percent of facilities reported that they were con-

16. "The review should cover four k_'y areas a) legislative and regulatory requirements, b) ri identification

of significant environmental aspects, c) an examination of
all existing environmental management practices and
procedures; landl d) an evaluation of feedback from the
investigation of previous incidents" ANSI/ISO 14001Management
Systems"Environmental
1996,

Specification with Guidance for Use," Annex A,paragraph
A.3. 1.
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a privileged audit as one that is "designed to
identify and prevent noncompliance and to
improve compliance, "17 which is not, at least
explicitly, what an ISO 14001 audit is
designed to do.'8 Some states, however.
arguably have language already broad enough
to drive an ISO 14001 audit easily through.19 1
would not rest contented, however, with the
language in those states' laws that the privilege only applies to "compliance" audits.
Legislation is infinitely mutable, of course.
And I at least, fully expect that there will be
pressure for privileging EMS audits, if they
indeed become part of the public policy mix.
All the same tired and unsubstantiated arguments will come crawling forth.
Some argue that privileging an audit will
not mean any less public information will be
available, that the same required reports, et
cetera, will still be there.
I would quibble there, too. It may be true
that the same public reports would be available, but there is a vast array of "secondary
materials," shall we say, that support those
reports, and that material, or much of it, is
also presently "public" in the sense of discoverable, and it will be easy, I think, in an audit
privilege system to render much more of that
information "privileged" and unavailable, at
least in state courts on state law issues.
We should be categorically opposed to
privileging environmental information. Period.
Audit privilege laws "promote secrecy, are
anti-law enforcement, impede public right-toknow, and can penalize employees who report
illegal activity to law enforcement authorities
17. Arkansas' statute, for example, defines "envi-

ronmental audit" as "avoluntary, internal and comprehensive evaluation ... that is designed to identify and prevent
noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutory
or regulatory requirements." 1995 Ark. Acts 350, 8-1301(3).
18. Presently the ISO 14001 standard only requires
that an organization's environmental policy include -a
commitment to comply with relevant environmental legislation and regulations." ISO 14001, supra note 16, at paragraph 4.2. Some argue that the standard, correctly
applied, will, in fact, assure compliance, The standard is
currently undergoing a "review and revision" process in
which one of the key debates is whether the language of

the standard itself should be modified to require compli-

ISO 14001 kAd&i oe, o Wd
a CM4n
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[Theyl discourage needed investments in pollution control, lower the standard of care,
undermine the rule of law, and endanger the
public," to quote EPAs Steve Herman-20
We need more information, not less,
Information is the sunlight and disinfectant
of our system Information is the great regulator.
There are, of course, "advantages to selfregulation," the title of our panel Though one
must certainly ask: advantages to whom? In an
ideal world, self-regulation could certainly be
"quicker, cheaper, smarter" And it could work,
if we trusted each other, but we do not, and
for fairly good reason If you do not believe
that, you have not been involved in these
issues long enough and/or you do not understand why we have several thousand pages of
federal environmental regulations. In brief,
experience has indicated to us that it is
money and not the public good that is the
bottom line
But therein lies the challenge Perhaps we
can, ultimately, have a system based on the
motto Trust, but verify" If so, the trust will
come slowly and the need for verification will
be very high for a long time. Information is an
important part of that verification ISO 14001
could be as well, I think A systematized
approach to environmental management is
inherently superior to a disorganized one. ISO
14001 is a systematized approach. But ISO
14001 risks its credibility if it gets corrupted
into a way to render important public information beyond the reach of the public and
the law
ance with the law as an element of conformance ,Ait the
standard
19 Some statutes for example af[ox a single
audit, rather than an. auditing program, to quafihf for
immunity, a provision that ould enzourage unscrupulou s
companies to -audit after a serious,. oiation for the purpose of obtaining immunity See dciscussion in Heart supra
note II at 308
20 Steven A Herman, EPA; 1998 Enforcement and
Complianice XAurance Prilrire3, N;7, LEp:.T,. E r0:;z:;
1 3,
I1-12 (Feb 19981

